Do Insurance Firms Learn From Repeated Contracts? - Evidence From the Korean Auto Insurance Market- by 한상은
 
 
저 시-비 리- 경 지 2.0 한민  
는 아래  조건  르는 경 에 한하여 게 
l  저 물  복제, 포, 전송, 전시, 공연  송할 수 습니다.  
다 과 같  조건  라야 합니다: 
l 하는,  저 물  나 포  경 ,  저 물에 적 된 허락조건
 명확하게 나타내어야 합니다.  
l 저 터  허가를 면 러한 조건들  적 되지 않습니다.  
저 에 른  리는  내 에 하여 향  지 않습니다. 




저 시. 하는 원저 를 시하여야 합니다. 
비 리. 하는  저 물  리 목적  할 수 없습니다. 








Do Insurance Firms Learn from 
Repeated Contracts? 





보험사의 정보 독점은 존재하는가?  











경영학과 재무금융 전공 





Do Insurance Firms Learn from 
Repeated Contracts? 





College of Business Administration 
The Graduate School 




Keywords: asymmetric learning, informational monopoly, auto insurance, 
residual market 





1. Introduction .......................................................................... 4 
2. Related Literature and Hypotheses Development  ............... 7 
3. Data and Summary Statistics ..............................................11 
4. Empirical Setups ................................................................ 13 
5. Empirical Results 
Policy Age and Claim Risk ................................................. 13 
Policy Age, Premium, and Profitability .............................. 19 
Policy Age and Claim Risk: Residual Market ..................... 20 
6. Conclusion .......................................................................... 22 
 
References .............................................................................. 38 
국문초록 .................................................................................. 40 
 
 3 
Tables and Figures 
 
Table1..................................................................................... 24 
Figure1 ................................................................................... 25 
Table2..................................................................................... 26 
Figure2 ................................................................................... 27 
Table3..................................................................................... 28 




Figure4 ................................................................................... 33 
Figure5 ................................................................................... 34 
Table7..................................................................................... 35 





With a large data set from Korean auto insurance market, this article 
examines the relationship between policyholders’ risk and the age of 
policies. Claim risk decreases with policy age, especially due to the 
decrease in claim frequency as contracts are repeated. Findings are 
consistent with theory on asymmetric learning and support the existence 
of an informational monopoly of an incumbent insurer in the Korean auto 
insurance market. Investigation on policies in the residual market further 
implies the strategic behavior of insurance companies based on their 
informational advantage.   
 
1. Introduction 
Studies on informational asymmetry have continuously evolved ever since 
the work of Rotschild and Stiglitz (1976). A large part of research focused 
on the cross-sectional relationship between policyholders’ risk and 
insurance coverage to examine the existence of adverse selection or moral 
hazard. However, information is not only a static factor and can be 
generated over time. Investigation on asymmetric learning catches these 
dynamic aspects of information and considers repeated contracting 
situations among two parties. The party who gains from asymmetric 
learning wins market power and subsequently generates profits.  
Despite the importance of information asymmetry and asymmetric 
learning in the empirical aspect, theory was not sufficiently supported by 
empirical findings until the last decade. After the findings of Chiappori 
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and Salanie (2000) that insurance data well suit the empirical setting for 
examining informational asymmetry, a series of studies investigated the 
existence of asymmetric information in various insurance market 
situations. In this article, I extend the literature one step further by 
identifying whether asymmetric learning exists in the Korean auto 
insurance market.  
The fundamental idea of this article is whether insurance companies build 
an informational monopoly by learning about their policyholders and 
exploit their informational advantage to generate profits. As a means to 
control loss ratios, insurance companies make efforts to learn about their 
policyholders by strengthening their underwriting and actuarial functions. 
It becomes an issue if these activities become a property to the incumbent 
insurer. This is an important point because when incumbent insurers 
generate information that their rivals are unable to observe, they can take 
an advantage from their learned information. As contracts are renewed, 
insurers can adjust premiums differently that is, they can perform price 
discrimination in a way that the firm takes more profits from low-risk 
insureds.  
The article is focused on the influence of the age of policies. First, whether 
the average risk of policyholders decreases with policy tenure will be one 
main point. When insurance firms gain an informational advantage they 
will apply a strategy to retain a larger fraction of low-risk insureds and a 
relatively smaller fraction of high-risk insureds. With asymmetric 
learning, informational monopoly grows with policy age and as a result, a 
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negative relation between policy age and the average risk of policyholders 
is established. Second, a more direct method to identify whether 
incumbent insurance companies gain from informational advantage is to 
test the relationship between profits and policy age. Profits should be 
higher for repeated contracts.  
The comprehensive data set used in this article makes it possible to 
account for individual-level information. This is an extension in the field of 
study since most of the insurance data use aggregated data sets which 
have limited intuitions. Furthermore, I investigated policy performance of 
policies in the residual market (shared market, involuntary market); high-
risk policies which are mandatorily assigned to insurers. The comparison 
between the voluntary and involuntary market implies the strategic 
behavior of insurance companies since the main difference between the 
two policy groups is the insurers’ ability to control risk by voluntarily 
deciding whether to write the contract or not. 
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. Related literature 
and hypotheses development are explained in the next section. Section3 
describes details of the comprehensive data set and the unconditional 
relationship between policy age and risk. Section 4 and 5 present the 
framework of study and examine the main results on the relationship 
between policy age and policyholders’ risk and insurers’ profitability. 





2. Related Literature and Hypotheses Development 
Related Literature 
Several studies investigated the existence of asymmetric learning in the 
insurance market. Mainly based on the adverse selection model of 
Rothshild and Stiglitz (1976), Kunreuther and Pauly (1985) concluded 
that insurers exploit their information monopoly and therefore, prices and 
profits increase over time in a setting where incumbent insurers are able 
to keep their information private. Multiple studies extending previous 
models include D’Arcy and Doherty (1990) and Dionne and Doherty 
(1994). Both found evidence of insurers’ behavior to systematically 
overcharge new polices and use commitment in order to low-risk 
policyholders. These studies used an aggregate data set which makes it 
difficult to identify the effect on the individual level.  The large set of 
individual level data used in this article makes it possible to overcome this 
shortcoming and investigate the auto insurance market more carefully. 
Chiappori and Salanie (2000) show a link between theory and empirical 
evidence of asymmetric information and provide an empirical application 
on the French automobile insurance market where no evidence for 
asymmetric information is found.  
This article is closest to Cohen (2012) and Kofman and Nini (2013). Cohen 
(2012) investigates the temporal pattern of profitability in a panel of 
Israeli insurers and concludes that there is evidence of asymmetric 
learning in the Israeli automobile insurance market. This conclusion is 
drawn from the fact that the ratio of premium to losses is larger for 
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policyholders with repeated contracts. On the other hand, Kofman and 
Nini (2013) used a large data set of Australian automobile insurance 
market and found no evidence for asymmetric learning. Both studies 
controlled for observable characteristics such as age, gender, or vehicle age.  
There are various possible causes for the different results between the two 
studies but I conjecture that the existence of bonus-malus coefficient plays 
an essential role in whether insurers possess an informational monopoly. 
A bonus-malus coefficient reflects the claim history of individual 
policyholders and is shared by insurers. By sharing bonus-malus records, 
information about policyholders is no longer held private by the 
incumbent insurer and subsequently, claim history becomes an observable 
characteristic that is easily obtainable.  
The Israeli insurance market does not regulate insurers to share 
information through bonus-malus systems. That is, incumbent insurers 
who are able to observe the claim history of a policyholder as the contract 
is repeated, has a high chance to hold information monopoly. However, in 
Australia, a “no claims discount” (NCD) rating factor is shared among 
insurers which reflects the frequency or timing of claims made. 
Subsequently, incumbent insurers do only have an extremely restricted 
informational advantage compared to competitors.  
In most countries that apply a bonus-malus scheme, the bonus-malus 
factor tracks the occurrence of at-fault claims. This is also the case in the 
Australian insurance market.  
However, the Korean insurance market applies a unique way to build the 
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bonus-malus factor. Unlike in other countries, the factor in Korea is based 
on accident severity rather than accident frequency. This may lead to a 
contamination in the bonus-malus coefficient since a series of small 
accidents may be given the same coefficient as an occurrence of a single 
accident with high severity. This implies that in the Korean insurance 
market, incumbent insurers who observe the exact claim history of 
repeated policyholders may generate informational monopoly. On the 
other hand, regulations conducted by the Korea Insurance Development 
Institute probably removes the possibility of informational monopoly since 
all individual level data is collected and shared. Even details on accidents, 
which are possible sources of informational monopoly, are known by all 
insurance firms after a certain period of time. Thus, I will examine 
empirical evidence to clarify whether information monopoly exists in the 
Korean auto insurance market.   
 
Hypotheses Development 
Kunreuther and Pauly(1985) and Kofman and Nini(2006) showed that in 
a situation where contracts are repeated, the incumbent insurer develops 
certain pricing power and exploits this to retain a higher percentage of 
low-risk policyholders. Kofman and Nini (2006) identified a positive 
relationship between claim occurrence and lapsation. Higher lapse rate 
for risky drivers seems to be consistent with asymmetric learning.  
However, there are various possible explanations for such cross-sectional 
relationship between accident frequency and lapse rate other than 
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asymmetric learning. Thus to confirm the existence of informational 
monopoly and pursuing consistency with former literature on policy lock-
in, I will focus on the following two hypotheses. This hypotheses 
development is also consistent with Kofman and Nini (2013).  
 
H1: Conditional on publicly observable information, insurance risk and 
the age of the policy are negatively related 
 
To carefully observe the existence of informational monopoly, the control 
for observable characteristics is essential. Even if a certain character is 
closely correlated with both policy age and accident risk, when all 
insurance firms can observe it, it cannot be regarded as a source of 
monopoly. Thus, in this article, I control for various observable 
characteristics contained in the data set. Insurance risk is defined by both 
accident frequency and accident severity. I use the number of claims as a 
proxy for accident frequency and the claim amount for accident severity. 
Severity is measured conditionally; that is, claim amount given an 
accident is examined.  
 Based on theory, insurers will gain a higher profit from repeated 
contracts. Therefore, profitability and policy tenure have a positive 
relation. Further, the size of profits indicates the strength of informational 
monopoly of the incumbent insurer compared to competitors.  
 
H2: Conditional on publicly observable information, insurance 
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profitability and the age of the policy are positively related.  
 
In short, the null hypothesis throughout the article is that neither average 
claim risk nor average profitability is related to the age of policy.  
 
3. Data and Summary Statistics 
The data set was obtained from one of the largest insurance companies in 
Korea. The individual level insurance panel data contains auto insurance 
claim records, coverage choice, premiums, and rating factors. Rating 
factors include variables such as policyholder’s age, gender, the age and 
type of the car, its capacity, and region of registration. The claim records 
can be used as a proxy for accident information, including the number of 
claims and the amount of claim payment. I assume that the number of 
claims and the amount paid proxy accident frequency and severity 
respectively. The sample period includes data from the year 2009 to 2012 
and the whole data set has 434,262 samples. Observations with less than 
one year of exposure were excluded in the frequency regression and 
policies that are co-insured are also left out for separate inspection. This 
leaves 410,287 observations. The dataset for the severity regression 
contains only 198,407 samples. Since I focus on the severity of a given 
accident, policies with partial exposure are also included but the sample 
set is smaller as only policies with claims are considered.   
Table1 presents the definitions of all variables included in the dataset. 
Independent variables are classified into three categories describing 
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policyholders, vehicles, or policies. Following Kofman and Nini (2013), I 
assume that all information available in the dataset is publicly available. 
Since the information below is collected at the start of the contract, this 
seems to be a reasonable assumption. The fact that certain information is 
publicly available means that it cannot be a source of information 
monopoly to the incumbent insurer against other competing insurance 
companies. Throughout the article, I will examine the impact of policy age 
on accident risk while controlling the publicly available variables. 
Especially noteworthy is the BMS variable, which reflects the claim 
history of a policyholder but is less reliable compared bonus-malus 
indicators in other countries for reasons described beforehand.  
 
Unconditional Claim Risk and Profitability by Policy Age 
Before starting the examination of policy age and accident risk, Figure1 
shows the unconditional relationship among claim risk and profitability 
by policy age. As shown in the figure, the average loss decreases from 
about 260,000 Korean won to 92,000 Korean won monotonically as policy 
tenure gets older. Further, claim loss also shows a downward trend by 
policy age, ranging from 261,000 Korean won to 167,000 Korean won. It is 
observable that the slope is steeper for claim amounts than premium, 
which indicates the possibility of insurers generating profits from policies 
that claim less. The increasing profitability measure of (1-Loss Ratio) 
supports the possibility. Overall, unconditional averages imply that the 
average risk falls with policy tenure. Figure1 presents both the average 
 
 13 
premium and claim costs. Both trend down with policy age, and (1-Loss 
ratio) grows subsequently.  
As mentioned in the “Hypotheses Development” part, to attribute the 
relationship presented in Figure1 to asymmetric learning, the 
relationship should remain after controlling for observable characteristics. 
That is, the patterns should not be explainable by observable factors. In 
the next section, I will examine the relationship in detail. 
 
4. Empirical Setup 
As a start for the empirical examination, I define the random variable  
as the number of claims on policyholder i, and the random variable  as 
the severity of accident conditioned on occurrence. For accident frequency, 
I assume a Poisson distribution and for severity a lognormal distribution. 
Following Kofman and Nini (2013), both distributions account for 
unobserved heterogeneity.  
The assumption for the claim frequency is that , where 
θ is the expected value of the number of claims and ν is a random 
variable which captures the unobserved heterogeneity in the model. In 
order to examine the annual number of claims, only samples with 
exposure of at least one year are used. The Poisson parameter varies by 
observable characteristics. In short, log(θi)=XiβN+ν is assumed where the 
random variable ν is modeled as a gamma random variable with mean 1 
and variance . As a result, the number of claims follows a negative 




 ……………… (1) 
 
The estimates and  are estimated by maximum likelihood estimation. 
From the equation,  indicates the size of unobserved heterogeneity. In 
the case where =0, the frequency distribution becomes a standard 
Poisson distribution.  
For the severity model, I assume a lognormal distribution and account for 
both claim and person.  
 
ln(Sij)=X`iβs + εij + μi       …………………………….(2) 
 
The random variable μ presents the unobserved heterogeneity. εij, a 
random variable with a mean of zero and variance σε2  presents the 
standard regression residual.. σμ2  indicates the heterogeneity on 
policyholder level. Due to this setting, this random variable directly 
captures the individual random effect in the claim severity regression. 
The parameters can be estimated by maximum likelihood. 
Throughout the article, I use three different specifications and include 
various control variables. All the control variables used in the regressions 
are presented in Table2 and all have a significant relation with claim risk 
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which is proven before starting the examination.1 The three specifications 
differ in flexibility. Specification (A) includes a full set of control variables 
and the policy age dummies from one year to four years or longer. 
Specification (B) includes only the dummy variable for new policies and 
(C) does not contain any variable controlling for policy age.  
 
5. Empirical Results 
Policy Age and Claim Risk 
Claim Frequency Results 
Figure2 plots the actual claim frequency risk indicated by the thin black 
line (A), with the mean predicted values of both specifications (B) and (C). 
Actual claim frequency indicates the mean predicted value from the 
negative binomial model. Model (B) includes a dummy for new policies 
and (C) includes no controls for policy age. It is observable that the 
decrease in claim frequency risk by policy tenure cannot be entirely 
explained by observable variables. Observable characteristics that vary by 
age cannot sufficiently explain the decline in the actual frequency of 
claims as the policy gets older. The gap between actual claim frequency, 
specification (B), and (C) confirm the results.  
Table3 reports the estimated coefficients from the three models 
respectively and presents the results in statistics. After controlling for 
observable characteristics, claim frequency risk decreases monotonically 
as policy age increases. A monotonic decrease in coefficients of policy age 
                                              
1 Results are not reported but available on request 
 
 16 
variables is observed. Besides, each specification includes σμ2 which 
measures the unobserved heterogeneity and all control variables listed in 
table2. It is noticeable that unobserved heterogeneity is significantly 
larger than zero and the size of estimate decreases by specifications. 
Strictly controlling for policy age increases the fit of the model. The table 
also reports measures of goodness of fit for each model. Both AICC and 
BIC become smaller with the inclusion of policy age controls. That is, 
adding more controls for policy age improves the fit of the model. Given 
the fact that two times the difference in log-likelihood values follows a chi-
square distribution with degrees of freedom equal to the difference in 
numbers of parameters, comparing the goodness of fit by log likelihood 
ratio between model (A) and (B) also confirms increased goodness of fit of 
model (A). The likelihood ratio statistic is 68.42 where a five percent 
critical value of the distribution for 4 degrees of freedom is 9.49. In 
addition, comparing model (B) and (C), the dummy variable for new 
policies (policy age 0) is also statistically significant. The positive 
coefficient indicates a higher risk for new policies. Moreover, the likelihood 
statistic is 140.56, where the 0.5 percent critical value is 3.84. In short, 
from figure2 and table3 one can conclude that there exists informational 
monopoly in claim frequency in Korean auto insurance market and that 
new policies are riskier than others.  
 
Claim Severity Results 
The sequence applied in the claim frequency examination is repeated for 
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the claim severity analysis. However, the sample size shrinks to 198,407. 
The sample set is much smaller than in the frequency analysis since claim 
severity is only examined when a loss occurs. In the claim severity 
regression, I account for a random effect for individual policyholders. 
Figure3 shows that claim severity does not systematically decreases by 
policy age. It seems hard to predict claim amount with policy age which 
implies no informational monopoly gathered in the aspect of claim 
severity as contracts are repeatedly written. Further, observable 
characteristics cannot explain claim severity by policy age. In figure3, 
means of the predicted values calculated by each specification are 
presented. The actual claim severity which is indicated by the black thin 
line is not sufficiently explained by specification (B) and (C). The 
difference between the models grows even larger as the policy age reaches 
four years and older. The result implies information, not fully captured by 
the control of observable characteristics.  
Formal statistics in table4 also show that there is no robust evidence for 
informational monopoly in claim severity results. Table4 reports the 
coefficients of the policy age dummies, the unconditional variance of ln 
(severity), and σμ2, the unobserved heterogeneity. I plugged the lognormal 
severity as the dependent variable and estimated the coefficients in the 
linear regression by maximum likelihood method. Unobserved 
heterogeneity presented by the unconditional variance, σs2 does not differ 
by specification. This implies that policy age variables do not capture any 
information not fully explained by observable characteristics. A random 
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effect by policyholder also seems to exist but there is no clear difference in 
size among specifications and the size itself is almost zero. This partly 
comes from the fact that the number of drivers who get involved in 
accidents more than once is relatively small to generate any random effect.  
Measures of the goodness of fit of the model are confusing. Comparing 
specification (A), which includes a full set of dummy variables for policy 
age and specification (B) including only a policy age 0 dummy, the log-
likelihood ratio is 0.96 where the five percent chi-square distribution is 
9.48. Thus, specification (A) does not raise the goodness of fit of the model. 
The results from AIC and BIC are consistent with log-likelihood results. 
Further, coefficients are not monotonically related to policy age. 
Comparing model B and C points out no significance of the dummy 
variable for policy age 0. In short, the inclusion of policy age 0 dummy 
variable does not increase the goodness of fit of the model. In short, it is 
difficult to confirm the existence of an informational monopoly in the 
claim severity analysis. 
Unlike the results on claim frequency risk, it is impossible to find a 
monotonic relationship between policy age and claim severity risk after 
controlling for various control variables.  
Until now, I confirmed the existence of an informational monopoly in the 
Korean auto insurance market, due to the low average claim frequency 





Policy Age, Premiums, and Profitability 
Another hypothesis from asymmetric learning identified in this article is 
that profitability decreases with policy age at a low rate. Recall the 
unconditional loss-ratio presented in figure1. The figure is consistent with 
theory and now I explore whether the relationship holds after controlling 
observable characteristics. Table5 shows the relationship between policy 
age and charged premiums. Coefficients are from ordinary least squares 
(OLS) regressions, where the dependent variable is the log of charged 
premiums. Specifications (A), (B), and (C) are identical to former sections. 
Results show evidence for a monotonic relationship between policy age 
and profitability after controlling for all observable variables. Coefficients 
decrease as policy tenure grows older. Charged premiums for policies that 
are four years or older fall with a high rate of change. Moreover, the 
goodness of fit of the models consistently increases as policy age is 
controlled. Overall, results of absolute measures of profitability cast light 
on empirical results consistent with asymmetric learning theory. When 
premium decreases at a slower rate than total claim costs, the insurance 
firm can make profit. Thus, based on the monotonic trend in premiums by 
policy age in table5, examination on relative measures are followed to 
identify whether loss ratios decrease as policy age gets older.  
Table6 confirms the results by examining a relative profitability measure, 
the loss ratio. Loss ratio is generally used to evaluate the profitability of 
insurance firms, indicating the claim amount to collected premiums. 
Results are evident; (1-Loss Ratio) is lower for new policies and increases 
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by policy age. Figure4  clearly shows an upward tendency of profitability.  
To conclude, profitability in both absolute and relative measures provides 
evidence for strategic behaviors of insurance firms based on their 
informational advantage compared to rivals.  
 
Policy Age and Claim Frequency: Residual Market 
Based on the results of the article, older policies are less risky due to low 
claim frequency. From this relationship, I conclude the existence of an 
informational monopoly in the Korean auto insurance market. However, 
there might be concerns that policy age not only proxies accumulated 
amount of information gathered by the incumbent insurer so that the 
negative relationship does not come from the strategic behavior of the 
insurance company. Considering such remarks, I examine the 
relationship between claim frequency risk and policy age for contracts 
that are not voluntarily written by the incumbent insurers but 
mandatorily assigned to them.  
The co-insurance system is equivocal to the residual market in the auto 
insurance system of the United States. A contract is co-insured when the 
applicant is too risky and insurers deny writing contracts with. However, 
to ensure the sustainability of the insurance market, such applicants are 
assigned to several insurers who share the risk together. Thus, in the case 
of co-insured contracts, insurers have far less space to strategically control 
the average risk regardless of the length of policy tenure.  
To examine the concept in more detail, I show the claim frequency results 
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for the third-party physical damage (PD) and the first-party physical 
damage part (PD). I examine the two separately because insurers are 
forced to accept third-party liability contracts when assigned but have the 
right to reject first-party physical damage. Based on the fact, I first 
hypothesize that there will be no linear relationship among policy age and 
the number of accidents for co-insured polices. Further, controlling for 
observable characteristics and policy age will be insufficient to explain the 
actual losses. At last, these two hypotheses will be even stronger for third-
party physical damage since the incumbent insurer has no power to 
control the policies.  
Figure5 shows the claim frequency risk of first-party physical damage for 
co-insured policies. The thin black line (A) indicates the actual claim 
frequency while (B) and (C) present the mean predicted values of 
specifications identical to those used in former sections. Same as in 
figure2, actual claim frequency indicates the mean predicted value from 
the negative binomial model. Specification (B) includes a dummy for new 
policies and (C) includes no controls for policy age. First, claim frequency 
is not monotonically decreasing with policy age. It is noteworthy that both 
specification (B) and (C) cannot predict actual loss frequency. This 
confirms the hypotheses stated in this section. Table7 shows the formal 
statistics of the regressions. After controlling for observable characteristics, 
there is no tendency by policy age. The goodness of fit does not show any 
consistent improvements. The dummy variable for new polices has no 
significant coefficient and the inclusion of the dummy does not improve 
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the fit of the model compared to no control for policy age dummies.  
Whereas insurance firms have a certain power to reject a policyholder’s 
application for the first-party PD, the insurer has no choice but to accept 
the contract when it comes to third-party PD. Figure6 is consistent with 
the hypothesis that there is no relevance between policy age and claim 
risk when the insurer has no informational monopoly on the policy. The 
actual claim frequency marked by the thin black line shows a random plot 
by policy age. Further, specification (B) and (C) are far from the actual 
claim frequency. Table8 confirms the results presented in figure6. There is 
no relationship between policy age and the number of claims after 
including a full set of control variables. Moreover, comparing the goodness 
of fit of various specifications shows no consistency to decide which model 
has stronger explanation power.  
Overall, the examination of policies of the residual market supports the 
fact that decreasing average claim frequency risk by policy age is evidence 
for informational monopoly and the strategic behavior of incumbent 
insurers based on informational advantage.  
 
Conclusion 
The study was initially motivated by conflicting results in empirical 
findings on the existence of information monopoly in nonlife insurance 
contract environment. Kofman and Nini (2013) who examined the 
Australian auto insurance market concluded that publicly available data 
capture all information about policyholders, subsequently removing 
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informational monopoly and point out that the NCD rating factor plays an 
essential role in preventing informational monopoly. The Korean auto 
insurance market also shares a bonus-malus factor which corresponds to 
the NCD rating factor in Australia. However, unlike in other countries, 
the Korean bonus-malus factor is based on accident severity rather than 
frequency and by sharing an aggregated bonus malus “score”, the market 
is left space for information monopoly since the claim history of a 
policyholder is not properly reflected. On the other hand, the existence of 
the Korea Insurance Development Institute may reduce the possibility to 
accumulate information monopoly since after a certain period of time, all 
accident details including the nature, time, frequency, and severity 
accidents is shared by all insurance firms in the market.  
Thus, in this article, I examine the existence of an informational monopoly 
in the Korean auto insurance market. Through finding a positive 
relationship between policy age and claim frequency after controlling for 
publicly observable underwriting factors I confirm the existence of 
informational advantage of incumbent insurers. Further, examination on 
profitability measures confirms that insurers subsequently generate more 
profit from older policies. Additionally, results on residual markets imply 
the existence of a strategic behavior of insurers since claim risk does not 
systematically decreases with policy tenure when insurers are not able to 




Definitions of Variables 
Policyholder Characteritics     
Age 
 
Age, in years, of the primary driver of the covered automobile 
Male 
 
Dummy variable indicating that the primary driver is a male 
Districts 
 
Dummy variables indicating the district of registration  
BMS 
 






Age, in years, of the insured automobile 
Insured Value 
 
Value, in 100million Korean won, of insured automobile in case of total loss 
Capacity 
 
classified into four categories 
Foreign 
 
origin of production 
Sportscar 
 





Age, in years, that the policy has been in-force, 0: less than one year, 7up: more than 7 years 
Premium 
 
Total premium charged on the policy 
Driving Experience  Driving experience in years, categorized into 8 dummies from 0 to 7 or longer 
Age_limit  
 
1 if special contract on age is included(classified into four categories) 
Lowmile 
 





Number of claims on the policy incurred during the policy period 
LOSS   Total value of claims made on the policy during the accident period 








Note: Figure1 presents unconditional averages of premium, total claim 
costs, and loss ratio by policy age. Premium (measured on the left axis) 
is the annual total amount of premium for a policy. Total claim costs 
(measured on the left axis) include all payments. The loss ratio is the 
total losses to total premium, and the figure shows 1-loss ratio 
(represented on the right axis), which is a common measure of 
insurers’ profitability. 
1-Loss Ratio (Right Axis) Premium (Left Axis) 





Panel A: Distribution of Control Variables 
Variable Mean Std Dev Minimum 25th Pctl Median 75th Pctl Maximum 
Age 42.05 13.90 18 31 39 51 80 
Male 0.72 0.45 0 0 1 1 1 
Vehicle Age 5.10 4.53 0 1 4 9 15 
Insured Value 11748447 12159872.98 10000 3890000 8520000 16330000 600800000 
Total Premium 255173 280594.41 0 0 219940 369560 11839140 
 
Panel B: Sample Means by Policy Age 
Policy Age Insured Age Male Vehicle Age  Insured Value BMS 
0 39.49 0.72 4.69 12411367.59 12.95 
1 40.34 0.72 4.74 12343542.71 13.17 
2 42.45 0.72 4.96 11922304.76 13.51 
3 45.61 0.70 5.23 11738003.41 13.83 
4up 54.80 0.76 7.54 7699884.08 16.09 





Predicted Claim Frequency Risk by Policy Age 
 
 
Note: This figure presents mean predicted annual claim frequencies by 
policy age for the models summarized in Table3. The thin black line 
represents the actual claim frequency and corresponds to the predicted 
values from model (A) which includes a full set of controls for policy 
age. The dotted line, (B), only includes a dummy variable for the policy 
age 0. The dashed line represents the predicted value of model C, 




Claim Frequency Risk – Impact of Policy Age Variables 
 
Note: This table presents coefficient estimates and standard errors in 
parentheses from the negative binomial models for the number of 
claims. Specification (A) includes four policy age dummy variables for 
each policy age group; specification (B) includes only control for new 
policies, and (C) includes no control variable for policy age dummies. 
All models include control variables listed in table2. AIC refers to the 




Dependent Variable: Number of Claims 
 
(A) (B) (C ) 
Policy Age 













σν2 1.2826(0.0205) 1.2855(0.0205) 1.2911(0.0205) 
Log-likelihood -191325.57 -191359.7763 -191430.0576 
AIC 405554.673 405617.0922 405755.6548 




Predicted Claim Severity Risk by Policy Age 
 
Note: This figure presents mean predicted annual claim severity by policy 
age for the models summarized in Table4. The thin black line represents 
the actual claim severity and corresponds to the predicted values from 
model (A) which includes a full set of controls for policy age. The dotted line, 
(B), only includes a dummy variable for the policy age 0. The dashed line 
represents the predicted value of model C, which included no control 




Claim Severity Risk-Policy Age Variables 
 
Dependent Variable: Ln(Claim Severity) 
 















σμ2 0.0036(0.0164)   
σs2 0.0300(0.1409) 0.0292(0.1450) 0.0292(0.1450) 
Log-likelihood 0.9744(0.0045) 0.9744(0.0046) 0.9744(0.0046) 
AIC -276480 -276481 -276481 
BIC 553066.4 553059.3 553057.4 
 
Note: This table presents coefficients estimates and standard errors in 
parentheses from OLS regression of claim severity. The dependent 
variable is the log of claim amount, that is, claim severity. 
Specification (A) includes 6 policy age dummy variables for each policy 
age groups; specification (B) includes only control for new policies, and 
(C) includes no control variable for policy age dummies. All models 
include all control variables presented in table2. AIC refers to the 





Charged Premiums-Policy Age Variables 
 
Dependent Variable: Ln(Premium) 
 
(A) (B) (C ) 
Policy Age 













Log-likelihood -58125 -58344 -58344 
AIC 116351.7 116784.6 116782.7 
BIC 116889.3 117290.6 117278.1 
 
Note: This table presents coefficients and standard errors in parentheses 
from the OLS models. The dependent variable is the log of the charged 
premiums. Specification (A) includes four policy age dummy variables for 
each policy age groups; specification (B) includes only control for new 
policies, and (C) includes no control variable for policy age dummies. All 
models include all control variables presented in table2. AIC refers to the 
Akaike information criterion, and BIC is the Bayesian information criterion.  
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Table 6  
(1-Loss Ratio)-Policy Age Variables 
 
Dependent Variable: (1-Loss Ratio) 
 
(A) (B) (C ) 
Policy Age 













Log-likelihood -651583 -651605 -652116 
AIC 1303269 1303306 1303390 
BIC 1303806 1303812 1303886 
 
Note: This table presents coefficients and standard errors in parentheses 
from the OLS models. The dependent variable is (1-Loss Ratio), a relative 
measure of profitability. Specification (A) includes four policy age dummy 
variables for each policy age groups; specification (B) includes only control 
for new policies, and (C) includes no control variable for policy age dummies. 
All models include all control variables presented in table2. AIC refers to 




Figure 4  
(1-Loss Ratio)-Policy Age Variables 
 
Note: This figure presents (1-Loss Ratio), a relative measure of profitability 
by policy age for the models summarized in Table6. The thin black line 
represents the actual (1-Loss Ratio) and corresponds to the predicted 









Note: This figure presents mean predicted annual claim frequencies by 
policy age for the models summarized in Table7. The thin black line 
represents the actual claim frequency and corresponds to the predicted 
values from model (A) which includes a full set of controls for policy age. 
The dotted line, (B), only includes a dummy variable for the policy age 0. 
The dashed line represents the predicted value of model C, which included 




Claim Frequency Risk-Impact of Policy Age_First-Party PD in the 
residual market 
 
Dependent Variable: Number of Claims 
 
(A) (B) (C ) 
Policy Age 













σν2 0.529(0.383) 0.51(0.374) 0.597(0.394) 
Log-likelihood -122.73 -122.8073 -124.5859 
AIC 373.599 367.7512 369.3084 
BIC 531.8844 515.4842 513.524 
Note: This table presents coefficients estimates and standard errors in 
parentheses from the negative binomial models for the number of claims for 
First-party PD, co-insurance policies. Specification (A) includes 6 policy age 
dummy variables for each policy age groups; specification (B) includes only 
control for new policies, and (C) includes no control variable for policy age 
dummies. All models include all control variables presented in table2. AIC 









Note: This figure presents mean predicted annual claim frequencies by 
policy age for the models summarized in Table8. The thin black line 
represents the actual claim frequency and corresponds to the predicted 
values from model (A) which includes a full set of controls for policy age. 
The dotted line, (B), only includes a dummy variable for the policy age 0. 
The dashed line represents the predicted value of model C, which included 




Claim Frequency Risk-Impact of Policy Age_Third-Party PD in the 
residual market 
 
Dependent Variable: Number of Claims 
 
(A) (B) (C ) 
Policy Age 













σν2 0.1024(0.198) 0.1066(0.199) 0.1124(0.202) 
Log-likelihood -151.17 -151.53 -152.08 
AIC 445.0144 439.7432 438.8464 
BIC 603.2997 587.4763 583.062 
Note: This table presents coefficients estimates and standard errors in 
parentheses from the negative binomial models for the number of 
claims for First-party PD, co-insurance policies. Specification (A) 
includes 6 policy age dummy variables for each policy age groups; 
specification (B) includes only control for new policies, and (C) includes 
no control variable for policy age dummies. All models include all 
control variables presented in table2. AIC refers to the Akaike 
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본 연구는 한국 대형 보험사의 데이터를 이용하여 가입자의 평균 위험 정
도와 가입기간의 관계를 살펴본다. 가입기간이 길어질수록 가입자의 평균 
위험도는 낮아진다. 이는 가입기간이 길어질수록 사고의 빈도가 줄어드는 
현상에 기인한다. 나아가 가입기간이 증가함에 따라 이들 가입자로부터 
얻는 보험사의 이윤이 증가하는데 이러한 연구결과는 비대칭적 학습에 대
한 이론의 예측과 일치하며 한국 자동차보험 시장에서의 정보 독점이 일
정 정도 존재함을 지지한다. 나아가 공동인수 대상 가입자들에 대한 연구
는 가입자 정보에 기반한 보험사들의 전략 활용을 방증한다.  
 
 
주요어: 비대칭적 학습, 정보 독점, 자동차보험, 공동인수 
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